Personal Jurisidiction Based on the Presence of Property in German Law: Past, Present, and Future by Kuner, Christopher B.
Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-1-1992
Personal Jurisidiction Based on the Presence of
Property in German Law: Past, Present, and Future
Christopher B. Kuner
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher B. Kuner, Personal Jurisidiction Based on the Presence of Property in German Law: Past, Present, and Future, 5 Transnat'l
Law. 691 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol5/iss2/5
Personal Jurisdiction Based on the
Presence of Property in German Law:
Past, Present, and Future
Christopher B. Kunere
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTON .................................... 692
I. HISTORY AND OPERATION OF VERMOGENSGERICHTSSTAND 694
A. History of Section 23 .......................... 694
B. Operation of Section 23 ....................... 695
C. Critical Reception of Section 23 ................. 700
1. Arguments in Favor of Section 23 ............. 700
2. Arguments Against Section 23 ................ 701
D. Vermgensgerichtsstand in Action: Recent Case Law. 703
Ill. VERMOGENSGERICHTSSTAND DE LEGE FERENDA ....... 708
A. Possible Reform of Section 23 ................... 708
1. Reform through the Courts .................. 708
2. Reform through the Legislature ............... 708
3. Reform by Treaties ........................ 710
B. Vermgensgerichtsstand under International Law ... 712
IV. CONCLUSION...................................... 716
* Of the New York and Illinois Bars. Staff Writer, Matthew Bender & Co., New York, NY.
J.D., Notre Dame Law School; LL.M. in International Legal Studies, New York University School
of Law.
The author would like to express his gratitude to Prof. Donald P. Kommers, Notre Dame Law
School; Dr. Eberhard Freiherr von Rummel, Freiburg-im-Breisgau; and especially to the German
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for allowing a year's study at the University of Cologne to
research this article.
This article is dedicated to my wife, Graziella.
All translations are by the author, unless otherwise noted.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................... 716
A. In General .................................. 716
B. Vermigensgerichtsstand from the Defendant's Point of
View ...................................... 717
C. Vermogensgerichtsstand from the Plaintiff's Point of
View ...................................... 718
D. Vermigensgerichtsstand from the Point of View of the
Forum ..................................... 720
E. Final Thoughts .............................. 722
I. INTRODUCTION
Is it possible, in a civil suit brought by a Kuwaiti citizen for
war-related property damage, that a German court might base
jurisdiction over the government of Iraq on the fact that an Iraqi
diplomat mistakenly left behind an article of underwear following a
stay at the Hotel Intercontinental in Frankfurt? Until recently, the
answer might very well have been "yes." Under the doctrine of
Verm~gensgerichtsstand, which is codified in section 23 of the
German Zivilprozepordnung (ZPO) or Code of Civil Procedure,1 the
ownership of property within the district of a German court by a
defendant not domiciled in Germany allows the court to assert in
personam jurisdiction' over that person. While improbable, the
above example is actually not as far-fetched as it might seem.
Following the Islamic revolution in Iran, section 23 proved to be a
powerful incentive for foreign plaintiffs with claims against Iranian
state enterprises owning property in Germany to bring suit there.3
The same might prove true during the 1990s for plaintiffs with claims
1. In this article "§ 23" and "Verm~gensgerichtsstand" are used synonymously unless
otherwise indicated.
2. In this article the term "jurisdiction" signifies jurisdiction to adjudicate, that is, jurisdiction
of a state "to subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals...."
RESTATEMENT (TiRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(b) (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEmENT (HIRD)].
3. Lawrence W. Newman, Dealing with ClaimsArising out of the GulfCrsis, J. INT'L ARB.,
Dec. 1990 at 49, 50-51.
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against Iraq. Moreover, a forgotten article of underwear has actually
been used to establish jurisdiction over a prominent foreigner.4
Section 23's expansive nature has caused it to be considered
"unwelcome in international legal relations,"5 as stated by the
Bundesgerichtshof(German Federal Supreme Court).6 Nevertheless,
it has been used in a number of infamous cases in recent years. One
was a suit brought by a Liechtenstein cement vendor against the
Central Bank of Nigeria, in which attachment of the bank's accounts
in Frankfurt was allowed by the Frankfurt Landgericht7 under
section 23.8 The only connection to Germany, in that case, was that
payment to the vendor was guaranteed by a letter of credit payable in
Frankfurt. In another case, the EssenAmtsgericht granted a petition
by New York-based Morgan Guaranty Trust and ordered attachment
of the holdings of the State of Iran in Krupp Steel GmbH, a major
German company. " This decision caused so much consternation
that the German government released a statement declaring that it
hoped to maintain good relations with Iran."
4. An Austrian provision similar to § 23 was used to gain jurisdiction over the French skier
Jean-Claude Killy, based on having left underwear in his hotel room. Jan Kropholler, Internationale
Zustdndigkeit, in 1 HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVLVERFAHRENSRECHTS 183, 320 n.681
(1982).
5. Judgment of Sept. 30, 1964, Bundesgerichtshof [BOH] (Supreme Court], 42
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 194, 199-200 (1965) (F.R.G.)
(referring to Vermgensgerichtsstand as "einen im intemationalen Rechtsverkehr unerwiinschten
Cerichtsstand"). See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition
of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 CoLuM. L R.nv. 995 (1967) [hereinafter Nadelmann
1]; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionaly Improper Fora, in CoNPiCr OF LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERSTATE 222 (David F. Cavers et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter Nadelmann II].
6. The Bundesgerichtshofis the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction in Germany. NORBERT
HORN HLP AL., GERmAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAw 31 (1982).
7. The Landgericht [LG] is a low-level trial court which in certain circumstances can hear
appeals from the Amtsgericht [AG], another type of trial court. HoRN HT AL., supra note 6, at 29-30.
8. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1975, Landgericht [LO] Frankfurt, 1976 Neue Juristische
Wocheschrift [NJW] 1044. See Ekkehard Schumann, Aktuelle Fragen und Probleme des
Gerichtsstands des Verm6gens, 93 Z7.rscHnFr FOR ZIVILPROZEP 408, 412-14 (1980); Christof von
Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters under the German Code of Civil Procedure,
16 INT'L LAw. 671, 681 (1982) (discussing this ease).
9. See HoRN HT AL, supra note 6 (regarding the Amtsgericht).
10. See Schumann, supra note 8, at 414-415; von Dryander, supra note 8, at 682 (discussing
this ease).
11. Schumann, supra note 8, at 414 n.16.
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Controversial cases such as these have now become less likely,
owing to a July 1991 decision of the Bundesgerichtshof which
represents the first real limitation on Vermbgensgerichtsstand in over
100 years.12 Nevertheless, the frequency with which plaintiffs rely
on section 23,13 together with unresolved questions concerning its
scope, make Verm6gensgerichtsstand a topic of continuing
significance which can shed new light on important questions of
international adjudicative jurisdiction.
II. HISTORY AND OPERATION OF
VERMOGENSGERICHTSSTAND
A. History of Section 23
The development of Vermbgensgerichtsstand is intimately
connected with that of two rules of ancient Germanic common law.
The first rule, forum arresti (foreign attachment jurisdiction),14
allowed a court in whose district assets of a non-resident defendant
were located to establish jurisdiction by attaching those assets,
thereby giving the successful plaintiff the opportunity to execute a
judgment against the attached assets only. 15 The second rule
allowed the court to attach a non-resident alien's property as the basis
for inpersonam jurisdiction (jurisdiction not limited to the value of
the attached assets).16 These two rules gradually developed into a
form of jurisdiction similar to modern Vermbgensgerichtsstand
which was adopted in all the great German civil procedure codes of
12. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BG-, 1991 NJW 3092; see Judgment of Aug. 6, 1990,
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Stuttgart, 1990 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 829.
13. See Jan Kropholler, Miglichkeiren einer Reform des Vermgensgerichfssandes, 1982
Zsn'scrmwr FOR REChTsVEROLEiCHuNO 1, 1 (finding that it has been used so often as to practically
supersede other jurisdictional forms). But see Haimo Schack, Verm5gensbelegenheit als Zustlndigket-
sgrund-exorbitant oder sinnvoll?, 97 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIvnyROzEp 46, 47 n.4 (1984) (rejecting
suggestions that Vermagensgerichtsstand is often used).
14. Nadelmanm I, supra note 5, at 231.
15. Nadelmann I, supra note 5, at 1004. In American terms, forum arresti jurisdiction is
quasi-in-rem since it allows a court to apply a "property interest in things that are within its borders
to the satisfaction of a claim unrelated to the thing." EUGENE ScoLES & PErER HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 212 (1982).
16. See Nadelmann I, supra note 5, at 1010.
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the 18th century, 17 and which ultimately was embodied in section
23 of the Civil Procedure Code of a united Germany that was enacted
in 1877.18 Section 23, the wording of which has not changed since
its adoption, 19 provides:
[(1)] For complaints asserting pecuniary claims against a person who has
no domicile (Wohnsitz) within the country, the court of the district within
which this person has property (Verngen), or within which is found the
object claimed by the complaint, has jurisdiction. [(2)] In the case of
claims (Forderungen) the debtor's domicile is considered the place where
the property is located, and when the claim is secured, the place where the
security is located is also so considered.20
Soon after its enactment, other countries adopted provisions
similar to section 23. The first was Austria in 1895,21 but the long
list also includes the former German Democratic Republic, several
Swiss Cantons, Liechtenstein, Greece, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
Japan, two Canadian provinces (Ontario and Quebec), Hungary,
Yugoslavia, the Russian Federal Socialist Republic, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Turkey.
B. Operation of Section 23
A basic understanding of civil jurisdiction under German law is
necessary to comprehend the operation of section 23. In Germany
17. See GEoRrIos RAMMos, DER GERICHTSSTAND DES VERM6oENs uND DAS AUSLANDER-
FORUM NACH VERGLEiCHENDEm REcur 9-12 (1930).
18. See Nadelmann , supra note 5, at 231.
19. Ekkehard Schumann, Der internationale Gerichtsstand des Vermrgens und seine
Einschrinkungen, in 2 STuDi IN ONORE DI ENRico TuLuo LEBMAN 839, 842-43 (1979).
20. ZrmIxLROZE-ORDNUNO [ZPO] § 23, translated in ARTHuR T. voN MEHREN & DONALD
T. TRAutMAN, THE LAW OF MUL1STATE PROB.MiS 673 (1965). The German text reads:
(1) Fir Klagen wegen verm8gensrechtlicher Anspriche gegen eine Person, die im Inland
keinen Wohnsitz hat, ist das Gericht zustlndig, in dessen Bezirk sich Vermogen derselben
oder der mit der Klage in Anspruch genommene Gegenstand befindet. (2) Bei
Forderungen gilt als der Oft, wo das Verm~gen sich befindet, der Wobnsitz des
Schuldners und, wenm fitr die Forderungen eine Sache zur Sicherheit haftet, auch der Ort,
wo die Sache sich befindet.
ZPO § 23
21. Schumann, supra note 19, at 842.
22. This list appears in Schack, supra note 13, at 51-52.
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international jurisdiction is based on statutory provisions which
control both venue and the court's jurisdiction over a particular
case,23 and which allocate cases by means of venue between all
courts of general jurisdiction. Limitations on jurisdiction thus arise
from statutory interpretation, not from constitutional
considerations,25 and the Anglo-American distinction between
jurisdiction in rem, quasi in rem, and inpersonam is largely
unknown.26 The relevant statutory provisions, which are contained
in the ZPO, may be divided into those dealing with general
jurisdiction, under which any kind of action is allowed, and those
dealing with special jurisdiction, under which only pecuniary or
property-related claims (vermdgensrechtliche Anspriiche) are
allowed.2 7 General jurisdiction over natural persons exists at their
domicile,28 and over legal entities at their seat.29
Section 23, which is one of the rules of special jurisdiction, is
designed to provide a forum for a creditor domiciled in Germany
against a debtor without domicile in that country, since no general
jurisdiction based on domicile in Germany exists for such a
defendant.3° While section 23 has gained most of its fame in cases
against foreigners, the provision may be used against Germans as
well, since the nationality of either party plays no role in the technical
23. See ULRICH DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1972);
von Dryander, supra note 8, at 672-75. This article will treat § 23's jurisdictional aspects only, and
will not examine its role as a rule of venue.
24. von Dryander, supra note 8, at 673.
25. l
26. Id
27. Henry P. de Vries & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions-A
Comparison of Civil Law ews, 44 IowA L. REV. 306, 331 (1959); von Dryander, supra note 8, at
675.
28. von Dryander, supra note 8, at 675.
29. Id
30. 1 STEIN-JoNAS, KOMMENTAR ZuR ZtViLuROZsIORDNuNG 742 (20th ed. 1980). Section
23 also provides jurisdiction in the district in which the object that is the subject of the complaint
(der mit der Klage in Anspruch genommene Gegenstand) is located (a type of in rem jurisdiction).
However, this clause presupposes a sufficient relationship between the claim and the object upon
which jurisdiction is based and thus will not be examined here.
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application of section 23."' Jurisdiction under section 23 can be
excluded by agreement between the parties.32
The various elements of section 23 have all been defined by
judicial decisions and academic commentators.3" Section 23
expressly applies to "actions" (Kiagen), which have been defined to
include attachment proceedings and preliminary injunctions,3 4
declaratory judgment actions,35 as well as normal civil actions. The
plaintiff (Kldger) may be anyone (including a legal entity), German
or foreign, 6 whether or not domiciled in Germany. 7 The action
must be brought at a time when all the elements for section 23 exist;
after this point jurisdiction continues even if one of the necessary
elements is no longer present before judgment is rendered.38 The
burden is on the plaintiff to establish the elements of section 23,
which includes giving a sufficient description of the defendant's
property upon which jurisdiction is based. It is not enough, for
example, to allege only that the defendant maintains "bank accounts"
within the district.4 "Pecuniary" (vermt'gensrechtliche) claims are
31. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 316; JocHEN SCHR6DER, INTERNATIONALE ZusTNDiGKEIT
379 (1971).
32. REINHOLD GaMER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZEfIRECHT 266 (1987); Haimo Schack,
Derogation des Vermgensgerichissrandes zwischen deutscher lex fori und ausldndischem
Prorogaionsstatut, 10 PRAxIS DES uTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFARRENsRECHTs [hereinafter
IPRAX] 19 (1990). See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 18, 1985, BGH, 94 BGHZ 156 (1985).
33. See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 20 and accompanying text (translating the
text of § 23).
34. Schumann, supra note 19, at 845; Rolf A. Schfitze, Forderungssicherung im
deutsch-iranischen Verhdtltnis, 1979 BETRIEBS-BERATER 348, 349; RICHARD Z6LLER,
ZWVPRO2npORDNUNG 215 (13th ed. 1981). Under German law a court ordering prejudgment
attachment, whether based on § 23 or another jurisdictional provision, need not have jurisdiction of
the underlying claim. Otto Sandrock, Prejudgment Attachments: Securing International Loans or
Other Claims for Money, 21 INT'L LAW. 1, 23 (1987).
35. GIMER, supra note 32, at 260.
36. Z6LLER, supra note 34, at 215.
37. De Vries & Lowenfeld, supra note 27, at 339.
38. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 319; RAMMOs, supra note 17, at 61.
39. Judgment of July 13, 1987, BGH, 9 IPRAx 166 (1989); GEMER, supra note 32, at 266;
1 STEIN-JoNAs, supra note 30, at 756.
40. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 8, 1986, Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Frankfurt, 8 IPRAx 24
(1988); see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing case). Judgment of Dec. 14, 1987,
LG Bonn, 1989 NJW 1225; see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing case).
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defined as those in which the personal or familial interest of a person
does not predominate over his pecuniary interest.41
Section 23 jurisdiction may be asserted against defendants,
including private persons and legal entities,42 and apparently foreign
States and their legal entities43 (at least as long as they do not enjoy
immunity under international law). 44 "Domicile" (Wohnsitz) in
Germany is determined by other statutory provisions.4 5 Under
section 23, property of the defendant must also be located within the
court's district for jurisdiction to arise. The location of physical
objects is determined by the place in which they are situated. 4
Determining location is more complex when considering inanimate
property. Claims or debts are located at the domicile of the
third-party debtor (Drittschuldner),47 as long he does not reside
48outside Germany. Other rules are applicable with regard to more
specialized forms of inanimate property.49 Jurisdiction under section
23 is not limited to claims having some connection to the property
upon which jurisdiction is based.5"
41. RAMMoS, supra note 17, at 23. Thus, for example, a divorce action is not considered
"pecuniary."
42. ZOLLER, supra note 34, at 215.
43. GERMER, supra note 32, at 266; 1 STE N-JoNAS, supra note 30, at 742. The most prominent
such cases were those concerning the Central Bank of Nigeria and Iran, see materials cited supra note
8 and accompanying text and supra note 10 and accompanying text.
44. Judgment of May 4, 1982, OLG Frankfurt, 1982 RIW 439. Cf Judgment of Apr. 12,
1983, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [highest administrative court], 64 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (1984) (deciding that attaching bank accounts established
in the name of Iranian state enterprises under § 23 did not in itself violate international law or
German constitutional law). The Bundesverfassungsgericht is Germany's highest court, with the
power "to decide only constitutional questions and a limited set of public-law controversies."
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 3 (1989); Judgment of Dec. 2, 1975, LG Frankfurt, 1976 NJW 1044 (determining that the
Central Bank of Nigeria was not entitled to immunity, and therefore allowing attachment based on
§ 23, while noting that the provision could be used against foreign States).
45. See Kropholler, supra note 4, at 323.
46. ZOLLER, supra note 34, at 216.
47. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 323.
48. Z/LER, supra note 34, at 216.
49. See Kropholler, supra note 4, at 323-24.
50. GEIMER, supra note 32, at 259. In American terms, Verm6gensgerichtsstand is thus a rule
of general jurisdiction ("power to adjudicate any kind of controversy") rather than of specific
jurisdiction ("power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
controversy that established jurisdiction to adjudicate"). Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1136 (1966).
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The most important element of section 23 has traditionally been
the inquiry into what constitutes "property" of the defendant. 51 As
section 23 does not define the term, the courts have done so. These
judicial interpretations have been the focus of most of the
controversy surrounding Vermbgensgerichtsstand. It has been
consistently held that the value of the property need not stand in a
specific relation to that of the claim.52 For example, jurisdiction has
been granted based on "property" such as four fruit baskets (for a
claim of DM 10,000) and several newspapers worth one dollar (for
a claim of US $4,194)." Such court decisions prompted one
commentator to note that the statutory definition of
Verm~gensgerichtsstand is not nearly as bad as what the courts have
done with it.54
The following general rules have emerged for defining property
under section 23: (1) it is defined neither economically nor in relation
to the claim; (2) it may be a physical object, a debt, or some other
claim to property or performance; and (3) it must have independent
value, meaning some sort of monetary value on the open market.
Therefore, objects which are not considered property include
personal letters, notes, receipts, assurances one will acquire a
particular piece of property in the future, and rights to an
inheritance.55 Monetary claims seem to have the greatest practical
significance for use of section 23,56 and here the law has been
particularly liberal. Jurisdiction may be supported by a debt owed to
the defendant even though it would not lead to actual payment and
even if the claim is owed by the plaintiff to the defendant. 57 It
51. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 318.
52. Judgment of Aug. 1, 1991, OLG DUsseldorf, 1991 NJW 3103; 1 STEIN-JONAs, supra note
30, at 745; Z6TO.R, supra note 34, at 216; von Dryander, supra note 8, at 680.
53. 1 STmN-JoNA, supra note 30, at 745 n.17; See SCHRMDER, supra note 31, at 381 (giving
further examples).
54. SCHR6DER, supra note 31, at 376.
55. 1 STEIN-JoNAs, supra note 30, at 745.
56. See Kropholler, supra note 4, at 320.
57. Il at 320-21. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1987, BGH, 1988 NJW 966 (holding that certain
claims can establish § 23 jurisdiction, even though they are practically worthless on the open market
since the company owing them is deeply in debt and unable to pay).
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should also be noted that the property need not be attached5 or even
subject to attachment (pfdndbar)" to serve as the basis for
Vermgensgerichtsstand. However, property must be obtained in
good faith to found jurisdiction. 60 For example, if the plaintiff
brings a frivolous suit against the defendant which is dismissed, he
may not base jurisdiction on the defendant's claim for costs against
him.
6 1
If all the elements of Verm6gensgerichtsstand are present, then
the court has full personal jurisdiction over the defendant; that is, his
liability is not limited to the value of his property within the
district.62
C. Critical Reception of Section 23
1. Arguments in Favor of Section 23
Section 23 has long been the object of both praise and scorn. The
provision has been defended as necessary to protect the German
creditor from having to bring suit against a debtor in a foreign
country.63 It has also been contended that the defendant's assets in
the district of suit are usually sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's
claim,' and that even if they are not, section 23 allows the plaintiff
to obtain a judgment which can be satisfied elsewhere or at a later
time.65 Defenders have also argued that section 23 is useful as a
"bargaining chip" in negotiations with other nations that have their
58. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 319; von Dryander, supra note 8, at 678. The authorities are
not in accord as to whether the value of the property must at least cover the costs of execution. See
e.g., SCHRODER, supra note 31, at 380 (stating it is not necessary for the value of the property to
cover the cost of execution); cf. 1 STEIN-JoNAs, supra note 30, at 747 (stating value of property
should cover costs of execution).
59. SCHR6DER, supra note 31, at 382-83.
60. 1 STEIN-JoNAS, supra note 30, at 750; Schumann, supra note 19, at 859.
61. Schumann, supra note 19, at 860-61; DROBNIG, supra note 23, at 323. Cf GEVMEM, supra
note 32, at 265 (noting that a good faith claim for reimbursement of costs is sufficient to found
jurisdiction).
62. von Dryander, supra note 8, at 678.
63. See Kropholler, supra note 13, at 1; Schack, supra note 13, at 48.
64. L.I. De Winter, Excessive Jurisdiction in Private International Law, 17 ILNT'L & COMP.
LQ. 706, 716-717 (1968).
65. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 20, at 674.
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own exorbitant forms of jurisdiction.66 Because section 23 is usually
used by German plaintiffs or foreigners living in Germany, its
existence benefits the German economy.67 By allowing jurisdiction
without attachment of the defendant's assets in the district, section 23
simplifies the process of acquiring jurisdiction.68 Further, the ease
of determining whether jurisdiction exists under the provision
promotes certainty and clarity in the law.69
2. Arguments Against Section 23
Opponents of Verm8gensgerichtsstand contend that itis improper
to allow jurisdiction by a court with no connection to a case other
than the accidental presence of assets within its district."0 On a more
practical level, a judgment based on section 23 will rarely be
recognized abroad, as the provision is considered exorbitant in most
countries.7 Therefore, the plaintiff normally has no chance of
recovery beyond the value of the defendant's assets in Germany. Use
of section 23 against foreigners can also backfire against Germans.
Under section 328 of the Zivilprozef ordnung, a foreign judgment
may not be recognized in Germany unless the foreign court had
jurisdiction under German law. 2 A foreign judgment against a
German defendant based on a foreign equivalent of
66. See Lee S. Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of
the Provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 24 INTL & COMp. LQ. 44,56 (1975); see also Nadelmann I, supra note 6, at
1014 (for an example of the retaliatory use of a jurisdictional provision by Belgium).
67. Kropholler, supra note 13, at 1.
68. SCHRODER, supra note 31, at 386-87.
69. GEemER, supra note 32, at 262. But see infra notes 214-216 and accompanying text.
70. ULRICH WAHl., DIE VERFEHLTE INTERNATIONALE ZusT'NDIGKErT 23-24 (1974);
Nadelmann I, supra note 5, at 1005-06; see infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing a case
in which the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt expressed this reservation).
71. See DROBNIG, supra note 23, at 323; F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in
International Law, 111 RncuEn DEs CouRs 1, 81 (1964) (reprinted in F. A. MANN, STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1973)); Nadelmann 11, supra note 5, at 229-30. But see Schack, supra note
13, at 53-54; GEiMER, supra note 32, at 260 (arguing that recognition abroad may not always be
necessary, since § 23 can be used to obtain a declaratory judgment and thus allow the plaintiff to
execute in Germany if the defendant later acquires property there).
72. See Dieter Martiny, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 35 AM. 1. COMP. L. 721, 734 (1987).
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Verm6gensgerichtsstand can thus be recognized in Germany, since
under German law the foreign court had jurisdiction. The presence
of section 23 therefore subjects Germans to the possibility of
foreign suits,73 though this danger has been reduced by treaty.74
Use of an exorbitant form of jurisdiction such as section 23 can
also lead to retaliation by other countries.
75
The lack of a requirement that there be a reasonable
relationship between the value of the claim and the value of the
defendant's assets in Germany, and the resultant possibility of
allowing in personam jurisdiction for a huge claim based on assets
of minuscule value, has also been criticized.7 6 Besides being
potentially unfair to the defendant, this permits jurisdiction when
there may be no realistic prospect of satisfying a judgment for the
plaintiff.77 Another traditional objection to section 23 is that it
allows suit when neither the parties nor the subject of the action
have any connection with Germany,78 though this is no longer
permitted.79 It is no coincidence that in cases involving section 23,
dismissal was often sought on the grounds that proceedings were
pending in a foreign court."s It has also been contended that an
action against a foreign State based on Verm6gensgerichtsstand
risks interference with Germany's foreign policy, 81 and that
73. See Id. at 739; GreMlin, supra note 32, at 269; Friedrich Juenger, The Recognition of
Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. CoMp. L 1, 15 (1988); Nadelmann
I, supra note 6, at 1012. Cf Schack, supra note 13, at 54 (accepting this danger as a matter of
fairness to those not domiciled in Germany).
74. See Martiny, supra note 72, at 727 (stating that "more than 96 percent of all applications
for the grant of execution in pecuniary matters ... are under a convention today").
75. See Nadelmann 1, supra note 5, at 1014-15; Nadelmann I, supra note 5, at 232-33.
76. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 328. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
77. Id.
78. See Id.; Schumann, supra note 19, at 865; von Dryander, supra note 8, at 679. See, e.g.,
Judgment of Sept. 18, 1959, OLG Mfinehen, 1960 Monatsschrift fur deutsches Recht [MDR] 146
(afrrming jurisdiction under § 23 in an action brought by an Israeli citizen and resident against
another Israeli citizen who was in Germany only for a short visit).
79. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 8, 1986, OLG Frankfurt, 8 IPRax 24 (1988); see infra notes
93-99 and accompanying text; Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980, OLG Frankfurt, 1980 RIW 874. See also
Ekkehard Schumann, Der Vermagensgerichtsstand (§ 23 ZPO) und der Einwand internationaler
Rechtshedngigkeir, 8 IPRAX 13 (1988).
81. See Schumann supra note 8.
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Vermgensgerichtsstand promotes forum-shopping, 2 violates the
principle of actor sequitur forum rei, 3 and is unconstitutional. 4
D. Vermtgensgerichtsstand in Action: Recent Case Law
An understanding of how section 23 functions in practice can
best be gained through examination of actual cases. The following
four cases are among the most significant involving the provision
to have been decided in recent years, and illustrate an increasing
judicial uneasiness with the unrestricted scope of
Vermtgensgerichtsstand.
In the first, case a German farmer brought suit in the Bonn
Amtsgericht against the Soviet Union, claiming that he had to
destroy part of his crop following the Chernobyl disaster.8 5 The
petitioner attempted to ground jurisdiction on section 23, but the
court rejected this argument and dismissed the petition. The
Amtsgericht first found that the petitioner had not alleged that the
USSR possessed specific assets within the district, but had simply
stated that it was liable to the extent of all its assets outside
Germany.86 While jurisdiction could have been based on an
assertion that certain embassy property served functions that did
not concern the USSR in its status as a foreign State, no such
assertion had been made. 7 Nor did the petitioner's vague
reference to a Soviet postal bank account in Cologne change the
result, since that would lie outside the court's district."3 On appeal
to the Bonn Landgericht89 the decision was affirmed, though in
82. Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European
Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. RLy. 1195, 1204 (1984).
83. SCHR6DERsupra note 31, at 377.Actorsequiturforum rei is a general principle of private
international law according to which the defendant must be summoned to the court of his domicile.
De Winter, supra note 64, at 716.
84. See, e.g., ScHRODER, supra note 31, at 402-03. However, the Bundesgerichtshofhas held
that Verm6gensgerichtsstand is not unconstitutional. Judgment of Nov. 24, 1988, BGH, 1989 NJW
1431; see also infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
85. Judgment of Sept. 9, 1987, AG Bonn, 1988 NJW 1393.
86. ld.
87. Id,
88. Id,
89. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1987, LG Bonn, 1989 NJW 1225.
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the meantime the petitioner had amended the petition to allege that
the USSR maintained several accounts in the main branch of the
Deutsche Bank in Bonn.9 The Landgericht found that some
information regarding the nature and value of the property is
necessary to found jurisdiction under section 23, and that a mere
reference to "bank accounts" is insufficient. 91
In the second case, the Frankfurt Oberlandesgericht9 refused
to grant an order of attachment sought by an American construction
firm against an Egyptian bank, in a case arising from a transaction
in Egypt governed by Egyptian law. 9" The court found that
allegations that the defendant maintained accounts with two
Frankfurt correspondent banks without any further supporting
information were insufficient to establish jurisdiction. 9 Nor did
the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant gave collateral to the
Frankfurt banks to secure loans suffice, since there was no
evidence that this collateral was actually present in Germany. 9
5
The court went on to express grave doubts about whether it was the
proper forum for the case, since the only connections with
Germany were the correspondent accounts in Frankfurt. 96
However, the court determined that there was no need to decide
this point because litigation on the case was already underway in
Egypt.97 It could not be assumed that the plaintiff's rights would
not be respected in those proceedings, or in case of a judgment for
the plaintiff, that the defendant would automatically remove all its
property from Germany.98 Therefore, dismissal of the case was
warranted.99
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Oberlandesgericht hears appeals from the Landgericht and, in certain instances, the
Amtsgericht levels. HORN ET AL., supra note 6, at 31.
93. Judgment of Dec. 8,1986, OLG Frankfurt, 8 IPRAX 24 (1988). See Schumann, supra note
80 (discussing this case).
94. Judgment of Dec. 8, 1986, OLG Frankfurt, 8 IPRAx 24 (1988).
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id
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In the third case, the Bundesgerichtshof reversed the dismissal
of an action against an Austrian corporation owning property in
Frankfurt. 00 The court found that the defendant had failed to
produce sufficient evidence to show that it and the plaintiff had
agreed to a forum selection clause such as to foreclose section 23
jurisdiction. 0 1 However, the most important part of the decision
was the court's discussion of the basic requirements for application
of section 23.102 The Bundesgerichtshof took notice of the
scholarly criticism that had been directed at section 23, but found
that such criticism "can in no way lead to the conclusion that the
courts will no longer apply section 23," and held that
Verm~gensgerichtsstand violates neither international law nor the
Grundgesetz (German Constitution). 10 3 Most significantly, the
Bundesgerichtshof noted the suggestions that section 23 be
interpreted restrictively, but expressly refused to do so, finding that
the present case, at least, did not in any way lead to a questioning
of the basis of Vermgensgerichtsstand.
The fourth, and final case represents a landmark in the judicial
interpretation of section 23."04 The plaintiff in that case, who was
British and did not reside in Germany, sued a Turkish bank with
offices in Germany based on a claim assigned by a Cypriot
construction firm relating to a construction project in Libya. 10
The plaintiff founded jurisdiction on section 23, arguing that the
defendant's property in Stuttgart was worth at least DM
150,000.106 The defendant objected that its property was worth at
most one-tenth this amount and that jurisdiction should be denied
since the case lacked any connection to Germany. 107 The
Landgericht allowed jurisdiction, but was reversed on appeal by the
Stuttgart Oberlandesgericht, which interpreted section 23
100. Judgment of Nov. 24, 1988, BGI-, 1989 NJW 1431.
101. Id.; GEdMER, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
102. Judgment of Nov. 24, 1988, BGH, 1989 NJW 1431.
103. Id.
104. Judgment of Aug. 6, 1990, OLG Stuttgart, 1990 RIW 829.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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restrictively and found that the plaintiff, the applicable law, and the
evidence to be presented were all unconnected to Germany.'0 8
Further, the court found that the mere presence of the defendant's
property is sufficient to found jurisdiction in cases without
connection to Germany only when a particular domestic interest of
the plaintiff must be protected." 9 The plaintiff's unwillingness to
bring suit in Turkey did not constitute such an interest." 0 The
court suggested four possible factors which would justify
jurisdiction in cases involving section 23: (1) that the plaintiff
resides in Germany; or (2) that the facts on which the claim is
based are most closely connected to Germany; or (3) that German
law is to be applied; or (4) that the plaintiff has some other worthy
interest in a German judgment."' Finding that none of these
conditions existed, the court denied jurisdiction."'
The decision was affirmed on appeal by the
Bundesgerichtshof,"3 which expressly determined that jurisdiction
can only be founded under section 23 if the case has a sufficient
connection to Germany beyond the presence of the defendant's
property. 4 This requirement was necessary to give effect to the
purpose of the provision, which was to allow plaintiffs domiciled
in Germany to sue defendants who were either domiciled abroad or
who moved around so often in Germany as not to established
German domicile."' Section 23 was not enacted to make it easier
for foreigners to bring disputes with no connection to Germany
before the German courts.6 The Court found that the failure to
require a connection to Germany would lead to forum shopping and
the trial of foreign matters in German courts, which could cause
friction with other countries." 7 The Bundesgerichtshof also
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id
113. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092.
114. Id
115. Id
116. Id
117. Id
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mentioned the difficulties faced by foreign defendants sued in
Germany, and rejected arguments brought by defenders of
Verm6gensgerichtsstand that the acquisition of property
demonstrates an "affinity" to Germany.118 The Court defended its
decision as consistent with precedent, since in none of the previous
cases involving section 23 had the defendant's connection to
Germany been in doubt (a point that could certainly be
disputed).119 Finally, the Bundesgerichtshof stated that the
plaintiff still had the option of suing in Cyprus or Turkey, and that
it was not prepared to allow jurisdiction only because the plaintiff
had no faith in the courts of those countries. 120
It should be noted that the Bundesgerichtshofs decision failed
to answer all the questions surrounding Vermbgensgerichtsstand.
For instance, it refused to reexamine the traditional view that the
value of the defendant's property need not stand in any specific
relation to the value of the claim, since in this case the defendant
owned substantial property in Germany. 121 Moreover, the Court
stated that section 23 is neither unconstitutional nor violative of
international law, while at the same time finding that a restrictive
application of Vermbgensgerichtsstand would better conform to the
growing tendency under international law to restrict the doctrine by
treaty.122 The Bundesgerichtshof also failed to mention the
four-part test for a connection to Germany that had been applied by
the Oberlandesgericht,123 though it did note that while the
plaintiff's domicile or residence in Germany would normally be
sufficient, in this case the plaintiff's ties to Germany were very
loose.124
118. I
119. Il
120. Id
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Judgment of Aug. 6, 1990, OLG Stuttgart, 1990 RIW 829.
124. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092.
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III. VERMOGENSGERICHTSSTAND DE LEGE FERENDA
A. Possible Reform of Section 23
1. Reform through the Courts
The controversy surrounding Vermbgensgerichtsstand has led
to numerous suggestions for its reform, the first of which involves
reform through the courts. It has been suggested that German
courts adopt the American doctrine of forum non conveniens,
allowing them to decline jurisdiction when a foreign court stands
in closer connection to a case.125 While the courts have
traditionally been unreceptive to this idea in cases involving section
23,126 the Bundesgerichtshof's decision discussed above suggests
that this view may be changing. 7 Another suggestion is that the
courts should view section 23 as a Notgerichtsstand, to be used
only when suit can not be brought against the defendant under any
other provision."
2. Reform through the Legislature
The second set of proposals involves reform through the
legislature. While repeal of section 23 would satisfy many
125. See ERuK JAYME, KoLUSIONsREcHT UND BANKOESCHRI'F MIT AUSLANDSBEROHRUN 30
(1977); von Dryander, supra note 8, at 680.
126. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 12, 1985, OLG Frankfurt, 6 IPRax 297 (1986) (affirming
jurisdiction under § 23, even though the plaintiff was an American bank suing a Spanish bank, and
the only contact of the case with Germany was the defendant's ownership of property being stored
in a warehouse at the Frankfurt airport); see also Burkhardt Lber, Forum Shopping, Forum non
Conveniensoderschlicht:Justizgewdhrungsanspruch, 6 IPRAx283 (1986); von Dryander, supra note
8, at 680 (stating that "German jurisprudence adheres strictly to the principle that once jurisdiction
is conferred upon a court pursuant to the ZPO that court must adjudicate the matter."). Cf. Judgment
of Dec. 8, 1986, OLG Frankfurt, 8 IPRAX 24 (1988); see supra note 93 and accompanying text
(discussing this case). The court expressed grave doubts about whether the lack of contacts between
the case and Germany made it the proper forum, but declined § 23 jurisdiction on other grounds. Id
127. See Judgment of Aug. 6, 1990, OLG Stuttgart, 1990 RIW 829.
128. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 332; Kropholler, supra note 13, at 9. The Bundesgerichtshof
has held that § 23 can only be used as a Notgerichrsstand if refusing to allow jurisdiction in Germany
would lead to a denial of justice. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092; Judgment of
Aug. 6, 1990, OLO Stuttgart, 1990 RIW 829.
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commentators, 129 the legislature would likely be hesitant to
remove a provision which is viewed as helpful to German
plaintiffs. 130 More realistically, it has been suggested that
jurisdiction under section 23 should be allowed only insofar as the
defendant's assets in Germany satisfy the claim.' 1' Further, that
execution of a judgment under section 23 should be restricted to
the value of the property upon which jurisdiction is based. 132
Another possibility would be to restrict use of section 23 to
plaintiffs who are either Germans or who have their domicile in
Germany, 133 even though this would conflict with the German
jurisdictional principle that the nationality of the parties is
irrelevant.134
Two further legislative reforms have been proposed. The first
involves copying a reform already instituted in Austria, whereby
the value of the assets cannot stand in great discrepancy to the
value of the claim and the assets must at least be valuable enough
to cover court costs.135 However, this might make it necessary to
bring several suits to satisfy a claim. 136
The second legislative reform is to adopt the recommendations
made in 1977 by the government-sponsored Commission for Civil
Procedure.137 The Commission first recommended that
Vermrgensgerichtsstand be available only in the district where the
defendant's property has been attached (the so-called principle of
Arrestschlag).3  This would at least restrict use of
Vermbgensgerichtsstand to cases in which the defendant has a
strong connection to Germany.139 However, this proposal has
129. See, e.g., SCHR6DER, supra note 31, at 403.
130. See von Dryander, supra note 8, at 680.
131. Schumann, supra note 19, at 857; see Schack, supra note 13, at 64-65 (arguing that a
plaintiff should be able to bring a declaratory judgment action for the full value of the claim).
132. Schack, supra note 13, at 64-65.
133. Kropholler, supra note 13, at 8; Schumann, supra note 19, at 863-69.
134. See Martiny, supra note 72, at 729-30. See also material at supra note 31.
135. Kropholler, supra note 13, at 5-6.
136. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 332.
137. Bundesministerium der Justiz, BERICHT DER KOMMISSION FOR DAS ZIVILPROZEPIRECHT
(Mar. 1977). See Schumann, supra note 19, at 843; von Dryander, supra note 8, at 684.
138. See Kropholler, supra note 13, at 7.
139. IU.
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been criticized on the grounds that it does not attack a central
problem of Verm6gensgerichtsstand, namely the lack of a
reasonable relation between the value of the assets and the value
of the claim.14 The Commission also recommended that
Verm6gensgerichtsstand be available in districts where the
defendant owns real property.14 1 However, none of the
Commission's proposals regarding section 23 have yet to be
adopted.
3. Reform by Treaties
Treaties are the final avenue of reform. Germany is a party to
two multilateral treaties that restrict section 23 by affecting the
direct jurisdiction of German courts. The most important of these
is the European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the
Brussels Convention).142 Article 3 of the Brussels Convention
prohibits the use of section 23 jurisdiction against a defendant who
is domiciled in one of the contracting States. 43 However, section
23 may still be invoked as a rule of venue by a German court
when international jurisdiction is founded on another basis144 and
as a jurisdictional rule for provisional remedies. 45 The Brussels
Convention has increased the chance of recognition and
enforcement of a judgment based on section 23 within the
Community since it mandates that judgments rendered in a State
140. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 330; Kropholler, supra note 13, at 7.
141. Kropholler, supra note 13, at 6-7.
142. Sept. 27,1968,29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) (consolidated and updated version) [hereinafter The
Brussels Convention]. As of 1990, the Brussels Convention was in force between Germany, the
United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
and Portugal. Id at 1416.
143. See Bartlett, supra note 66, at 49. According to Art. 4 of the Convention, § 23 can be used
against defendants domiciled outside the contracting States. Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the
European Economic Community and the United States, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1044, 1059-60 (1981).
144. Schumann, supra note 19, at 849; 1 STaIN-JoNAs, supra note 30, at 754.
145. The Brussels Convention, supra note 142, art. 24. See F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of
International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty Years, 186 REcunu DES Couns 1, 72 (1984)
(reprinted in F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDmS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1990)); Schiltze, supra note
34, at 349.
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Party must be recognized in another State Party even if based on
a form of exorbitant jurisdiction.'46 Another treaty, the Lugano
Convention, 147 prohibits use of exorbitant jurisdictional
provisions, such as section 23, between domiciliaries of the
European Communities and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA).148
Germany has concluded a number of bilateral treaties which
restrict the use of Verm~gensgerichtsstand by regulating the
recognition and execution of judgments. 4 9 Treaties with Great
Britain, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia forbid recognition of
judgments based on section 23 in the signatory nations." 0 While
these treaties do not technically invalidate the jurisdiction of
German courts under section 23, the effect is to discourage section
23 jurisdiction when the defendant's property in Germany is of
minuscule value."5 ' Two other bilateral treaties, with Austria and
Greece, restrict execution of a judgment based on
Verm6gensgerichtsstand to the country where it was rendered when
the defendant so demands.'52 This represents a return to classical
forum arresti jurisdiction by limiting execution of the judgment to
the property on which jurisdiction is based.'53 Another possible
restriction is contained in bilateral treaties with Belgium, Israel, and
the Netherlands. These treaties allow suit based on
Verm6gensgerichtsstand as long as the defendant has neither his
146. See The Brussels Convention, supra note 142, arts. 26,27(1),28,34; von Dryander, supra
note 8, at 682-83; von Mehren, supra note 143, at 1059.
147. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989). Most members of EFTA had forms of jurisdiction
similar to § 23 which are excluded by the Lugano Convention. See P. Jenard & G. M6lier, Report
on the Lugano Convention, 29 I.L.M. 1481, 1484, 1487-88 (1990) [hereinafter Lugano Report].
148. See Lugano Report, supra note 147, at 1485-86. As of 1990 the members of EFTA were
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Id at 1483.
149. The texts of all these treaties, except the one with Spain, can be found in I ARTHUR
BOLOW & KARL-HEINz BOCKSTImGEL, DEn INTERNATIONALE RECHSVERKEHR IN ZIVIL- uND
HANDELSSACHEN Nos. 610-704 (1990). The text of the treaty with Spain can be found in 1987
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I p. 3 4 . It should be remembered that application of many of these bilateral
treaties is limited because of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
150. See Kropholler, supra note 4, at 326-27; Schumann, supra note 19, at 849-50.
151. See GEI NR, supra note 32, at 268-69.
152. See Schumann, supra note 19, at 850-51.
153. Id at 851.
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domicile nor his usual residence in any of the signatory
nations. 154
The bilateral treaty with the most far-reaching restriction on the
use of section 23 is that concluded with Norway.155 This treaty
provides that a defendant with domicile or usual residence in one
of the State Parties may not be sued in the other State on the basis
of Vermbgensgerichtsstand solely because he holds assets in that
other State. 156 Vermbgensgerichtsstand may only be used when
either the claim is secured at the start of the proceedings or the
value of the claim does not exceed the value of the defendant's
assets in the State where suit is brought.'57 This type of treaty
has been praised as the best mechanism for controlling
Verm~gensgerichtsstand internationally.'58
B. Vermndgensgerichtsstand under International Law
The status of Verm6gensgerichtsstand under international law
has not been thoroughly examined in the past, probably because
"[i]nternational law has not yet developed a comprehensive set of
rules defining with reasonable precision, all forms of jurisdiction
that may be exercised by states. . .,159 However, the propositions
that certain bases of civil jurisdiction are considered exorbitant, 160
and that international law places some limits on the adjudicative
jurisdiction of national courts,' 61 are now accepted by a significant
154. Id. at 851-52; Kropholler, supra note 4, at 327.
155. See Kropholler, supra note 4, at 326.
156. Kropholler, supra note 13, at 5.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Louis HENKIN, Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 821 (2d ed. 1987).
160. RESTATEMENT (TlIRD), supra note 2, at ch. 2 introductory note. See Detlev F. Vagts,
Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms in International Business, 203 RECUML DES COURS 9, 40 (1987);
von Mehren, supra note 143, at 1058.
161. Eg., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 299 (3d ed. 1983);
Mann, supra note 71, at 10-11; RESTATEMENT CrHIRD), supra note 2, ch. 2, intro note; Gary Born,
Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. L.INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 11, 19
(1987). Butsee the following German authorities, all of whom reject such limits: GrIMER, supra note
32, at 261; Kropholler, supra note 4, at 214-15, 328-29; HAI o SCHACK, JURISDICTIONAL MINIMUM
CONTACTS SCRUTINIZED 8 n.54 (1983); Matthias Herdegan, Book Review, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 207,
209 (1991) (reviewing RESTATwEENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
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portion of the international legal community. These limits have
generally been defined in terms of reasonableness162 or closeness
of contacts. 163 It is important to determine the propriety of
Verm6gensgerichtsstand under international law, since German law
requires its rules of international jurisdiction to be interpreted in a
manner consistent with international law.164
International law does not appear to be violated when
jurisdiction is limited to the value of the property upon which it is
based, that is, forum arresti or quasi in rem jurisdiction. 165 The
presence of property establishes a "sufficiently close link" to the
forum to establish jurisdiction over the defendant up to the
property's value." With regard to unlimited personal jurisdiction
based on the ownership of property, some authorities have stated
that it does violate international law, 67 while others have rejected
the proposition.'6" At the present time, Verm6gensgerichtsstand
does not appear to violate customary international law. The
continued use of Verm6gensgerichtsstand in Germany and
numerous other countries,169 together with the seeming lack of
STATES); Bernd von Hoffmann, Gegenwartsprobleme internationaler Zustdndigkeit, 2 IPRAX 217,
217 (1982).
162. See RESTATEmENT (MTiRD), supra note 2, at introductory note to Part IV, stating that rules
in the Restatement concerning jurisdiction "notably the principle ofreasonabIeness... have emerged
as principles of customary law"; Ua §421(1). See also Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court of California, Solano County, 107 S. Ct. 1026,1035 (1987), in which the Court recognized the
necessity of inquiring into the "reasonableness" of an assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant.
163. Mann, supra note 71, at 49, 97; Mann, supra note 145, at 25, 31.
164. Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092; 1 STEiN-JoNAS, supra note 30, at 58,
752 n. 110.
165. Mann, supra note 71, at 81; Restatement (Third), supra note 2, § 421(2)(k).
166. See Mann, supra note 71, at 81.
167. See Mann, supia note 145, at 69. See also Schumann, supra note 8, at 439 (stating that
use of Verm6gensgerichtsstand against a foreign State violates customary international law).
168. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 24, 1988, BGH, 1989 NJW 1431; GEIMER, supra note 32, at
260; HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 159, at 882; Schack, supra note 13, at 60-61; SCHRODER, supra note
31, at 403 n. 1763.
169. See Shack, supra note 13, at 51-52 (listing States, besides Germany, that recognize the
doctrine).
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diplomatic protests against its use, 170 suggest that
Verm~gensgerichtsstand is not contrary to customary international
law. 1
71
However, this conclusion does not end the inquiry into the
status of Vermbgensgerichtsstand under international law. It should
not be forgotten that Vermgensgerichtsstand, together with similar
types of asset-based jurisdiction, 172 is now excluded among the
parties to the Brussels 173 and Lugano Conventions. 174 Further,
Germany has concluded bilateral treaties with a number of States
excluding or severely limiting its use. Vermgensgerichtsstand is
also restricted by two other multilateral treaties, the Protocol to the
Hague Convention concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 175 and the
170. See Michael AkehurstJurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 172
(1972-73) (admitting that Vermgensgerichtsstand "enables a State to exercise jurisdiction over cases
and parties having no real connection with that State," while noting that "no State seems to have
protested that such jurisdiction is contrary to international law"); HENKIN Er. AL., supra note 159,
at 821-22. But see RESTATEMENT CrHiRD), supra note 2, ch. 2, intro note (declaring that States
'increasingly... object to the improper exercise of jurisdiction as itself a violation of international
principles").
171. See Hans Baade, Book Review, 22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 793, 805 (1974) (reviewing F.A.
MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973)) (stating that any rule limiting jurisdiction under
international law must be "founded on a clear and convincing demonstration that it was supported
not only by custom as evidenced by state practice, but also by ihe opinio necessitatis iuris, Le., the
belief on the part of states that their practice was required by international law").
172. See Lugano Report, supra note 147, at 1487. The report lists Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, alnd the United Kingdom as having some sort of asset-based
jurisdiction which has been superseded by the Lugano Convention. See also Juenger, supra note 82,
at 1211.
173. See The Brussels Convention supra note 142. Kropholler finds that the Convention
strengthens the validity of Vermbgensgerichtsstand under international law, since art. 4 permits use
of § 23 against non-Community domiciliaries. Kropholler, supra note 4, at 329. However, this
interpretation seems perverse; the importance of the Convention surely lies in the limits it puts on
§ 23, not in the fact that it retains the provision for one class of defendants.
174. See The Lugano Convention supra note 147.
175. Articles 2 and 4(a) of the Protocol allow recognition and enforcement of a judgment to
be refused if jurisdiction was based solely on the presence of property. As of July 27, 1990 the
Convention was in force between only three countries, namely Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
29 IL.M. 1072-75 (1990). Admittedly, the failure of more States to become parties argues against
the significance of these two articles of the Protocol as rules of customary international law. See
Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 REcuEIL DES CoURs 25, 100-101 (1970). The text of the
Protocol can be found in Kurt Nadelmann & Arthur T. von Mehren, The Extraordinary Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 361, 369-70 (1967). See
also GmuiARD K aEj INTERNATIONAES PRIvATaEcHT 698 (6th ed. 1987) (discussing the
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European Convention on State Immunity. 7 6 The restrictions
placed on Verm6gensgerichtsstand by these treaties may indicate
that it is gradually becoming regarded as violative of customary
international law.1 7 7 Alternatively, it is possible that
Verm6gensgerichtsstand violates the general principle of
international law that national courts must be reasonable in
exercising jurisdiction in international cases.178
The case for considering Vermbgensgerichtsstand to be
violative of international law may admittedly be rather tenuous.
However, the trend in the international legal community toward
viewing the doctrine as unreasonable is unmistakable. Even the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional
Convention).
176. May 16, 1972, Furop. T.S. No. 74. The Annex to the Convention lists several bases of
jurisdiction upon which a judgment against a State Party may not be based under arts. 20(3)(a), 24(2),
and 25(3)(b), one of which is the presence of property, unless the action is related to such property.
As of 1990 the Convention was in force between Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. CHARLEs LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC ImmuNiTY
9-10 (3d ed. 1990). See Kropholler, supra note 4, at 325; Schumann, supra note 8, at 427-29
(discussing the Convention).
177. See Judgment of July 2, 1991, Bundesgerichtshof, 1991 NJ.W. 3092, supra note 113
(implicitly recognizing this possibility by noting that a restrictive application of
Verm6gensgerichtsstand would better conform to the growing tendency under international law to
limit the doctrine by treaty); RESTATEMENT (rHIRD), supra note 2, at § 102(3) comment i: -A wide
network of similar bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute practice and also result in
customary law." See also Juenger, supra note 73, at 16 (noting that "guidance to distinguish between
acceptable and exorbitant jurisdictional bases" may be derived from treaties). Akehurst, supra note
170, at 172, and Kropholler, supra note 4, at 329, cite the International Convention on Certain Rules
Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision of 1952, which allows actions arising from the
collision of ships to be brought where the defendant ship has been seized and does not limit
jurisdiction to the value of the ship, as support for the validity of Vermagensgerichtsstand under
international law. However, this single treaty is hardly entitled to a great deal of weight, given its
specialized subject matter and the number of later treaties which restrict Verm6gensgerichtsstand-type
jurisdiction.
178. See Born, supra note 161, at 20 (referring to "an emerging principle of international law
requiring assertions of judicial jurisdiction to be reasonable"); Juenger, supra note 73, at 16 ("there
may indeed be a trend toward international criteria of reasonableness"); Schumann, supra note 8, at
429.
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Court) 179 recognized that section 23 poses "significant questions"
under international law.'
IV. CONCLUSION
A. In General
Verm6gensgerichtsstand has not received a thorough evaluation
under the norms and policies of international law relating to
adjudicative jurisdiction. Defenders of the doctrine tend to make
emotional appeals about the unfairness of forcing plaintiffs to
litigate in forums outside of Germany, such as "Tahiti, Nicaragua
or Laos.""' They justify the doctrine chauvinistically by insisting
that anyone acquiring property in Germany must thereby consent
to jurisdiction in Germany.'82 Further, defenders of the doctrine
contend that section 23 is no worse than jurisdictional bases used
in other countries.'83 Opponents, on the other hand, often describe
the provision as exorbitant or unreasonable without any detailed
explanation.'84 Verm6gensgerichtsstand must be evaluated from
the perspectives of the three participants in a lawsuit (the
defendant, the plaintiff, and the forum) based on closeness of
contacts 85 and reasonableness,' 86 which have become the
predominant factors under international law for determining the
propriety of a jurisdictional base.
179. See supra note 44 (regarding the Bundesverfassungsgerich).
180. Judgment of Apr. 12, 1983, BVerG, 64 BVerfGE 1, 18 (1984) (holding that attachment
under § 23 of bank accounts established in the name of Iranian state enterprises did not in itself
violate international law, the court determined that it did not have to decide the international legal
propriety of § 23, but did find that the provision raises significant questions under international law).
But see Judgment of Nov. 24, 1988, BGH, 1989 NJW 1431 (The Bundesgerichtshof stated that
Verm6gensgerichtsstand does not violate international law).
181. Eg., Schack, supra note 13, at 49.
182. Eg., GmMERm, supra note 32, at 261.
183. E-g., Bartlett, supra note 66, at 55-56.
184. Eg., Mann, supra note 145, at 69.
185. Mann, supra note 71, at 49, 97; Mann, supra note 145, at 25, 31.
186. See materials cited at supra note 162.
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B. Verm6gensgerichtsstand from the Defendant's Point of View
Judging Vermbgensgerichtsstand first from the defendant's
point of view, the degree of connection provided by the defendant's
ownership of property within the jurisdiction is infinitely variable.
Certain types of property, such as land, indicate a substantial
connection to the jurisdiction, while others, such as personal
articles, demonstrate an insignificant degree of connection"8 7 (at
least for claims not strictly related to the status of such property,
i.e., quasi in rem rather than in rem actions). A century ago, the
presence of a person's property may have indicated a significant
connection with the forum. However, in this age of convenient
travel and frequently shifting assets, this assumption is no longer
justified.188 Thus, one defect of jurisdiction based on the presence
of property is that it casts its net too wide, snaring defendants with
little or no connection to the State.
Verm~gensgerichtsstand is even less satisfactory when used as
a basis for unlimited personal jurisdiction. It is logical that the
presence of the defendant's property should justify asserting
jurisdiction over that defendant for judgments not exceeding the
value of that property. 189 However, this logic is wholly absent
when unlimited personal liability is asserted against a defendant
based on the presence of property within the jurisdiction. Property
does not have some talismanic significance such that control over
it should give a court full control over the owner. Attempts to
counter this argument by German scholars rest on absurd legal
fictions. These scholars contend that a person must be deemed
ready to defend his property wherever it is in the world,' or that
the ownership of property in Germany indicates use of the German
economic system.191 Even if these arguments are accepted, they
do not justify jurisdiction beyond the value of the property within
the court's district.
187. See Schack, supra note 161, at 60-61; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 20, at 671-73.
188. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 50, at 1178.
189. See Mann, supra note 71, at 81.
190. von Hoffmann, supra note 161, at 220; Schack, supra note 13, at 49.
191. GmMER, supra note 32, at 261.
717
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
Moreover, Venn6gensgerichtsstand fails to require a reasonable
relationship between the value of the claim and the value of the
property. International standards of reasonableness, however
nebulous they may be, are surely violated when jurisdiction for a
claim of several million dollars is based on the defendant's leaving
his shoes in a hotel room.192 It is no use arguing that cases
involving property of minuscule value are almost never
brought. 93 This assertion, even if accepted, provides no reason
not to eliminate the possibility of such a suit by requiring a
reasonable relation between the value of the claim and the property.
Thus, Vermgensgerichtsstand appears unfair and arbitrary from a
defendant's point of view.
C. Verm gensgerichtsstand from the Plaintiff's Point of View
The picture is quite different from the plaintiff's perspective,
since the expansiveness of Verm6gensgerichtsstand makes it easier
for the plaintiff to bring suit. In this respect,
Verm6gensgerichtsstand can best be understood as a response to
the maxim actor sequiturforum rei which is designed to restore
some advantage in litigation to plaintiffs,194 particularly German
plaintiffs.19
However, Verm6gensgerichtsstand promotes the plaintiff's
interests to an excessive and unnecessary extent. There are
motivations for a foreign defendant not to abscond, even when a
domestic judgment can not be enforced against him abroad. These
192. See Mann, supra note 71, at 81 ('From the point of view of the doctrine of international
jurisdiction the objection.. .lies in the fact that assets of trifling value are said to justify civil
jurisdiction in respect of claims of unlimited size.").
193. See, e.g., Reinhold Geimer, Zur Rechofertigung des Vermgensgerichsstandes, 39
JuRISTrNznTuNG 979, 980 (1984). This argument also conflicts with the point made by another
defender of § 23, Schack, supra note 13, at 54, that the provision is useful even if the defendant's
property in Germany is minuscule in case he brings in more assets at a later date.
194. See Kropholler, supra note 13, at 9.
195. Von Dryander, supra note 8, at 681. German scholars generally place considerable weight
on the interests of the plaintiff in determining jurisdictional limits in international cases, based on the
difficulties of suing in a foreign country. Eg. Erik Jayme, Book Review, 1991 NJ.W. 3077
(reviewing HAIMO SCtACK, INTERNATIONALFS ZIViLVERFAHRENSRECHT (1991)); Kegel, supra note
175, at 684-85.
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include the wish to continue doing business in the jurisdiction or
to bring assets there in the future.1 96 Moreover, it is unfair to
assume that plaintiffs are always at a greater disadvantage than
defendants when litigating abroad.197 Further, the defendant's
ownership of property does not constitute one of those special
situations in which it may be just to favor the plaintiff's forum,
such as when "the controversy arises out of conduct that is
essentially multistate on the part of the defendant, and essentially
local on the part of the plaintiff."1 9 Since the plaintiff initiated
the suit, a policy of discouraging frivolous litigation is better served
if he has to bear more of the attendant burdens.' 99 The plaintiff's
rightful concern that the defendant will abscond or conceal assets
can be assuaged by relying on provisional remedies when
appropriate.2"0 This avoids section 23's mistake of treating all
non-resident defendants as "presumptive absconders." 20
1
While Vermbgensgerichtsstand may give an unjustified
advantage to the plaintiff bringing suit, it can prove
disadvantageous to him once a judgment is obtained, since a
196. Born, supra note 161, at 23. See Z Ltd. v. A, (1982) 1 All E.R. 556, 572 (C.A. 1981)
(where Lord Justice Kerr noted that in many international cases the defendants 'are generally persons
or concerns who are established within the jurisdiction in the sense of having assets here which they
could not, or would not wish to, dissipate merely in order to avoid some judgment which seems
likely to be given against them... . ").
197. See Born, supra note 161, at 25.
198. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 50, at 1167-68. See De Winter, supra note 64, at
717; Hans Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis
of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 335, 351 (1972).
199. See Born, supra note 161, at 5 n.17, 25; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 50, at
1127-1128.
200. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 50, at 1178. See also Michael B. Mushlin, The
New Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55
BRoOK. L. REv. 1059, 1110 (1990):
It is also no answer to say that quasi in rem jurisdiction is necessary to prevent the
out-of-state defendant from fleeing, from removing property from the jurisdiction, or from
secreting assets. If any of these factors can be established in a particular case they justify
attachment, not for the purpose of jurisdiction, but rather for security.
Id. German procedural law provides for interim protective measures. See Laber, supra note 126, at
283; Sandrock, supra note 34, at 22-25.
201. Mushlin, supra note 200, at 1111. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text
(discussing a case in which the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt noted that it cannot be assumed that a
defendant will automatically remove all his assets from Germany to prevent execution there after
losing a case in another country).
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judgment based on section 23 is unlikely to be recognized abroad.
The argument has been made that the interest protected by
Verm6gensgerichtsstand is that of allowing the plaintiff to litigate
at his forum, and even if execution is not possible, the plaintiff can
use section 23 to obtain a declaratory judgment or toll the statute
of limitations so as to protect his rights should the defendant bring
assets back into Germany.2 °2 However, it strains credulity to
argue that the plaintiff has so little interest in having a judgment
executed; presumably his object in suing is to obtain compensation
for his damages as soon as possible. Most plaintiffs can obtain
execution since most non-resident defendants need continued access
to Germany and are not willing to sever all ties to the country
because of a lawsuit. Those defendants that are willing to abscond
are unlikely to bring assets back into Germany knowing that a
sizeable judgment has been entered against them. Thus, the plaintiff
is provided little protection by section 23 if the defendant is
determined to abscond.
D. Vermigensgerichtsstand from the Point of View of the Forum
Verm~gensgerichtsstand is particularly unattractive from the
forum's point of view. Until the Bundesgerichtshof s recent
decision discussed above, 20 3 the wide scope of section 23
encouraged the adjudication of suits in Germany with no
connection to that country. This broad application risked causing
204 ifriction with other States,2  particularly in cases involving a
202. See Schack, supra note 13, at 64. But see 1 STEN-JoNAS, supra note 30, at 742-43 (stating
that one of the purposes of § 23 is to allow a plaintiff to execute a judgment on at least some of the
property of a non-resident defendant).
203. See Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092.
204. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 50, at 1127:
[1]n establishing bases for jurisdiction in the international sense, a legal system
cannot confine its analysis solely to its own ideas of what is just, appropriate,
and convenient. To a degree it must take into account the views of other
communities concerned.... Conduct that is overly self-regarding with respect
to the taking and exercise ofjurisdiction can disturb the international order and
produce political, legal, and economic reprisals.
IaL
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foreign State entity. 05 While this possibility may now be less
likely, the Bundesgerichtshofs failure to articulate clear standards
for deciding when section 23 jurisdiction is appropriate places a
considerable burden on the German courts. Moreover, the other
objectionable elements of Vermbgensgerichtsstand, such as the
non-enforceability of judgments based on section 23 outside of
Germany, make it an inefficient basis for international litigation
and a waste of the forum's resources. Protection of Germany's
domiciliaries, the only real interest of the forum which
Vermgensgerichtsstand promotes, can be adequately assured by
reliance on more legitimate jurisdictional bases.
Defenders of Verm6gensgerichtsstand often argue that Germany
must retain section 23 until procedures for the recognition and
enforcement of judgments are strengthened at the international
level.20 6 There is no doubt that the doctrine exists to a great
extent because of difficulties in obtaining recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.0 7 While it cannot be disputed
that great improvements in this sphere would reduce much of the
need for Verm6gensgerichtsstand, awaiting such a utopian
development sounds suspiciously like an excuse for doing
nothing.2 8 As the country with the dubious distinction of having
given Vermbgensgerichtsstand to the world, Germany has a special
responsibility for its reform,20 9 which would best be done
internally. As Professor Nadelmann argues with regard to
exorbitant jurisdictional rules, "Why should negotiation of treaties
be required when correction of defects in municipal law can
remove a large part of the trouble which has arisen? What glory
can come from maintenance of defective municipal law?" 210
205. See e.g., materials cited at supra notes 8 & 10.
206. See, e.g., Kropholler, supra note 4, at 330.
207. DROBNIG, supra note 23, at 323; Juenger, supra note 73, at 28; Nadelmann I, supra note
5, at 1008-09. But see Schack, supra note 13, at 48, 60 (arguing that even if foreign judgments were
easily enforceable, Verm6gensgerichtsstand would still be necessary when it would be unfair for the
plaintiff to litigate abroad).
208. See Kropholler, supra note 4, at 331.
209. l
210. Nadelmann 11, supra note 5, at 237.
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E. Final Thoughts
A reasoned examination of Vermbgensgerichtsstand leads to the
conclusion that it is not satisfactory from the points of view of the
defendant, the plaintiff, or the forum. Under section 23 the
defendant may be subjected to full personal liability if he owns a
minuscule amount of property in Germany. The plaintiff is, on the
one hand, given an unfair advantage in bringing suit, but on the
other hand, receives a judgment which he cannot enforce abroad.
Moreover, pursuant to section 23, the forum must open its courts
to inefficient and burdensome litigation.
While this state of affairs has been improved somewhat by the
Bundesgerichtshof's decision of July 1991,211 that case did not
resolve a number of important questions concerning section 23. For
instance, most criticism of the provision has centered on its
unfairness to defendants, but the Bundesgerichtshof's opinion
limited section 23's scope only when the plaintiff has insufficient
contacts to Germany. The court also refused to determine whether
the value of the property upon which jurisdiction is based need
stand in any specific relation to the value of the claim. However,
the court's emphasis on the facts of the case suggests that it might
be willing to do so given the proper case.212 Perhaps most
importantly, the Bundesgerichtshof gave the German courts a great
deal of discretion to determine when the plaintiff's connection to
Germany is sufficient to support jurisdiction.
It would be ironic if this case were to herald the development
of a doctrine of forum non conveniens in Germany.213 German
defenders of Verm6gensgerichtsstand have traditionally viewed it
as their country's counterpart to American long-arm jurisdiction,
that is, a necessary mechanism for asserting jurisdiction over
foreign defendants.2 14 However, while prerequisites to long-arm
211. See Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 NJW 3092.
212. 1d.
213. See L6ber, supra note 126 (discussing the German attitude to forum non conveniens).
214. See, e.g., von Hoffmann, supra note 161, at 220; Schack, supra note 13, at 47.48.
Arguments by German scholars equating American quasi in rem jurisdiction with
Verm6gensgerichtsstand (e.g. Schack, supra note 13, at 48, 53) are not convincing. Quasi in rem
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jurisdiction such as the existence of minimum contacts seem
impossibly complex and arbitrary to the Germans, 215 they have
always regarded Verm~gensgerichtsstand as, if not perfect, easy to
apply.2"6 This ease of application, even if it can be criticized as
"the kind of clarity commonly produced by an arbitrary rule,"217
has been considerably reduced by the Bundesgerichtshof's ruling.
Whatever criticism can be made of it, the Bundesgerichtshofs
bold decision to limit the scope of section 23 must be welcomed
as the enlightened realization that a form of jurisdiction which may
have had some justification a century ago had to be brought into
conformity with modem standards of international jurisdiction.
Given the Bundesgerichtshof's new willingness to rethink the
application of Verm6gensgerichtsstand, further challenges to the
doctrine are likely, particularly in cases in which allowing
jurisdiction would be blatantly unfair to the defendant (such as
when property of small value is used to support jurisdiction for a
huge claim). Far from saying the last word concerning
Vermbgensgerichtsstand, the Bundesgerichtshofs recent decision
wrote a new chapter in the history of a jurisdictional provision that
is likely to be the subject of continuing interest for years to come.
jurisdiction has always been limited to the value of the assets upon which jurisdiction is based, unlike
Verm6gensgerichtsstand, and has been further restricted by the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). As noted by De Vries & Lowenfeld, supra note 27, at 332, "Article
23 is quite different from the American invention of jurisdiction quasi in rem." Likewise, attempts
to justify § 23 by criticism of American jurisdictional rules (e.g. Schack, supra note 13, at 47-48)
must be rejected, if American rules are exorbitant then that is a reason to change them, not a reason
to retain Vermagensgerichtsstand in its present form. See Patrick J. Borehers, Comparing Personal
Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40
AM. . COMP. L 121 (1992) (regarding possible reform of American rules of personal jurisdiction).
215. See, e.g., Schack, supra note 161, at 16, 72.
216. See, e.g., GEIER, supra note 32, at 262. It is not surprising that the Bundesgerichtshofs
decision and that of the Oberlandesgericht which it affirmed have been criticized by German
defenders of Verm6gensgerichtsstand. Klaus Fischer, Zur internationalen Zustdndigkeit deutscher
Gerichte nach §23 ZPO, 1990 RIW 794; Reinhold Geimer, Rechtsschurz in Deutschland kinfiig nur
bei Inlandsbezug?, 1991 NJW 3072.
217. Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L 249, 279 (1991).
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